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ABSTRACT
Contact, Identity and Prejudice: Comparing Attitudes Toward
American Arabs Pre- and Post- 9/11/01
Meghan Wight
Department of Sociology
Master of Science
Using social contact and social identity theories, I seek to show how attitudes of
mainstream American society toward individuals of Middle-Eastern descent (Arabs) have
changed eight years after September 11, 2001 when compared to similar data from shortly after
the terrorist attacks. I use data gathered from nationally representative opinion polls and the
theoretical constructs of social contact theory and social identity theory to understand how
attitudes have changed in the eight-year period. I first provide a firm grounding in the social
contact and social identity literature, analyze the race/attitudinal data, and finally show how both
social identity and social contact theories are useful when looking at attitudes toward Arabs post
September 11, 2001. Initially, I expect that an inverse reaction to social contact will be observed
leading to negative attitudes. At the same time, I expect that shared social identity will increase
over time and positively affect attitudes toward Arabs. The results suggest that greater contact
does not necessarily lead to positive attitudes about an out-group (in this case the Arab minority).
In addition, the results show social identity’s ability to affect attitudes decreases over time. I
conclude that the ability to change attitudes is dependent on an individual developing greater
understanding and knowledge of the out-group thereby expanding social identity. I argue that
this is a useful method to decrease out-group prejudice. I conclude the two theories are useful as
they both can inform public policy campaigns and public perception.

Keywords: contact theory, social identity theory, prejudice, race, ethnicity, September 11,
attitudes
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Introduction
The events of September 11, 2001, oriented the social dialogue and Americans’ attention
toward the Muslim minority population in America and abroad. The effect of these events on
U.S. public perception of Muslim minority individuals has yet to be carefully studied. A few
researchers have examined the effect that 9/11 has had on the Muslim religion (Byng 2008), how
perceived Arab threat leads to prejudice (Gonzalez et al. 2008), and in-group/out-group relations
more generally (Tausch et al. 2009, Strabac and Listhaug 2007). In this thesis, I will examine the
selected effects that the September 11, 2001 attacks had on American attitudes toward the
Muslim minority group members in the United States.
I use data from nationally representative opinion polls, and I use the theoretical constructs
of social contact theory and social identity theory to explore how attitudes changed between
9/11/2001 and 2009. Data collection for the first survey was completed two months after
9/11/2001, while the second survey was conducted eight years after the terrorist attack. As a
result of the attack, national media outlets initially focused on terrorism often linked with Arab
or Muslim suspects and continue to do so today. To understand the implications of the attack and
overall feelings toward Muslim/Arabs, I assert that social contact theory will be useful, but not in
the traditional use of the theory; rather, I argue the reverse. I will argue that in mainstream
society, increased levels of contact and understanding between American-Arabs will not lead to
favorable attitudes toward Arab-Americans, and I will assert that negative attitudes will increase
with increased levels of contact. The vehicle for reducing unfavorable attitudes between
Muslims/Arabs and mainstream America, I argue, will be shared identity, in this case shared
religious identity.
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A possible explanation for the correlation between increased negative attitudes and
increased contact can be found in Nacos and Torres-Reyna’s discussion of media attitudes
toward Arab/Muslim ethnicity in the months pre- and post-9/11. In their case study of news
articles about Muslims and Arabs post 9/11, they found that the media portrayed Arab/Muslims
as a group to be feared, leading to a sixteen percent increase in negative news stories over the
period between six months and one year after the terrorist attacks (Nacos and Torres-Reyna,
2007).
In the present study, I will compare indicators relevant to the social contact and social
identity theories in trying to interpret change in attitudes toward Muslims shortly after 9/11 and
eight years later. Examining results over time is important in both the social contact and identity
studies, because both theories are integrally linked to public perception at a time when American
attitudes toward a single minority group was transformed in one day. While public perception
may have changed in a day, the effects of September 11th have continued to influence the
American psyche. Understanding how September 11th changed public perception over time
informs us of the relational strength between social contact, social identity, and attitudes. I first
provide a firm grounding in the social contact and social identity literature. Then I analyze the
two waves of attitudinal data. Finally, I assess the utility of the two theories in explaining
changes in attitudes toward prejudice against Arabs post September 11, 2001.
Significant Prior Research
In developing my thesis, I first summarize the pertinent literature relevant to both contact
theory and social identity theory. Then, I consider possible effects of social cohesion, imagined
social contact, the conceptual Arab, attitudes, and the role of media in group relations. I conclude
with hypotheses derived from the subsequent literature and attitudinal research.
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In addition to these two main theories, I draw from several additional theoretical
orientations related to social contact and social identity. Key indicators for social contact include
imagined social contact, realistic group conflict, common in-group identity, and political
predispositions. Additional variations of social identity theory are social cohesion and
homophily. I supplement these concepts with an understanding of Bauman’s “Conceptual Jew.”
I borrow the concept to introduce my idea of the “Conceptual Arab.” This concept of the Arab
population has been entrenched in popular American media and entertainment for decades
(Saheen 2006) and resulted in Islamaphobic attitudes. These attitudes combined with the media’s
portrayal of Arabs post 9/11 have formed general public perception. The interplay of indicators
of these variables informs my hypotheses, and helps to explain the results.

Social Contact Theory
Social contact theory was originally developed to explain how contact between majority
and minority groups is related to prejudice, and to examine inter-group relations (Allport 1954;
see Pettigrew & Tropp 2008 for a review of this literature). It is through intergroup contact that
group members are able to observe similarities between themselves and the out-group, and
increase contact is usually associated with declining prejudice (Allport 1954). Allport notes that
the recognition of these similarities reduces prejudice between groups, and at times eliminates
prejudice completely. Specific ways that social contact reduces prejudice include: 1) enhancing
an individual’s knowledge about the out-group, 2) reducing the individual’s anxiety about
intergroup contact, and 3) increasing an individual’s empathy towards out-group members and
taking their perspective (Allport 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp 2008).
Early studies involving social contact theory highlighted the ability of contact to reduce
hostile attitudes between competing groups (Sherif et al 1961). Others have noted the effect that
3

different types of contact have on overall attitudes (Johnson and Jacobson 2009). Johnson and
Jacobson (2009) highlight research by Sigelman and Welch (1993) which showed that knowing a
single individual from another group is not sufficient to reduce prejudice. Researchers also
identify other aspects of contact that affect intergroup attitudes including the social status of the
interacting groups (Yancey 1999), the variety of social contacts shared between groups (Yancey
1999), and the importance of personal interaction between group members (Hewstone and
Brown 1986).
Not all of these prejudice-reducing factors are equally affected. Some (such as empathy
and reducing anxiety) have been shown to reduce prejudicial attitudes more than others
(Pettigrew & Tropp 2008). One of these, social contact, has been shown to reduce prejudice, yet
it is not seen as an essential condition for doing so (Pettigrew & Tropp 2006).
There are several variations of the social contact hypothesis. I will discuss one of them—
imagined social contact. Imagined social contact can affect personal prejudice towards certain
ethnic/minority groups. This means that if an individual imagines a negative social interaction
with a certain racial/ethnic group he or she may be prejudiced towards that group. This variant of
social contact theory is particularly interesting because it is focused on the mental simulation of
the social objects (Crisp and Turner 2009). Psychologists have found that these mental images
elicit both motivational and emotional responses that are akin to the motivational and emotional
responses that result from real experiences (Dadds, et. al 1997). Therefore, imagined social
contact is part of intergroup contact and typically results in reduced anxiety and negative outgroup attitudes (Crisp and Turner 2009). Specific instances of imagined social contact will be
explained further in the discussion of “The Conceptual Arab” and the media’s influence on
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public perceptions. Group conflict and its related processes are also relevant to intergroup
relations.

Group Conflict
Group conflict theories suggest that realistic contact theory, identity theory, social
cohesion, the instrumental model of group conflict, common in-group identity, and political
predispositions all play a role in the development of group attitudes. Group conflict theories also
are relevant to intergroup attitudes and out-group tensions.
On the basis of realistic conflict theory, various scholars (LeVine & Campbell, 1972;
Sherif, 1966; Bobo & Johnson, 2000; Kluegel and Bobo, 2001) have noted that the perceived
realistic threat between two groups over valued resources will lead to negative intergroup
attitudes. According to this line of research, the stronger the in-group identification the
individual has, the stronger the perceived threat from the out-group. As a result, individuals that
strongly identify with the in-group are more likely to participate in violence against or to be
aggressive toward members of the out-group than those that loosely identify with the in-group
(Kelly, 1988; Struch & Schwartz, 1989; Branscombe & Wann, 1994).
Other researchers have suggested an alternative explanation of negative attitudes toward
Muslims post-9/11, using the instrumental model of group conflict (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson,
Armstrong, 2001). This model builds on realistic conflict theory and holds to two fundamental
tenants that could lead to intergroup conflict: stress, which comes from either an unequal access
to resources or the social hierarchy, and social dominance orientation. According to this theory,
individuals who have high levels of social dominance are more likely to be prejudiced against
out-groups in order to maintain their own dominance. Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, and Armstrong
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(2001) have shown that American attitudes toward immigrants strongly reflect this social
dominance orientation and therefore the instrumental group conflict theory.
Political predispositions also affect intergroup attitudes. The argument is that prejudice is
ascribed to groups that threaten the status quo (Whitley 1999). Political predispositions are
considered to be deep-seated and thus are not subject to change, depending on the different
political attitudes in differing political climates. These predispositions create a way of ‘ordering’
society and expectation that low-status groups should stay ‘in their place’ and not challenge the
existing system of inequality (Miller, Smith, and Mackie 2004).

Social Identity Theory
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) also is relevant to prejudicial attitudes
toward Arab-Americans post-9/11. This theory also focuses on understanding how others are
similar to in-group members (in this case, mainstream American society). Social identity theory
focuses on whether individuals perceive themselves to be similar or dissimilar to out-group
(minority group) members. Key elements of social identity theory relate to, how attitudinal
predispositions either facilitate or prevent an individual joining the in-group. Specially, they
include;
“1. Individuals strive for a positive identity
2. Group membership forms an important component of their identity
3. Individuals search for positive group distinctiveness
4. Individuals maintain a positive self-image by engaging in comparisons
between their in-groups and various out-groups in such a way that they favor their
in-group” (Van Oudenhoven, Judd, and Ward, 2008) .
Currently, these key elements are manifest in Arab relations in America and abroad. For
instance, many Arabs in the United States feel that they are more American than Arabic. Their
identity is not their outward appearance but their inward identification. Other Arabs, while still
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firmly adhering to their Islamic faith, strive to broadcast that they and their religion are peaceful,
and not like the Arabs who participated in the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Bayoumi, 2009). Yet their
efforts to identify with the in-group (mainstream American society) are not always granted or
reciprocated by the majority society. To identify with the in-group is only one step of the
process. Individuals must also be accepted into the in-group, something that isn’t always
occuring for individuals of Middle-Eastern descent. A large component of being accepted in the
in-group is the in-groups’ attitude toward the out-group—something members of the out-group
have little control over.
Several studies have found significant associations between minority group attitudes
based on an individual’s national, ethnic, or social group identification (Duckitt and Mphuthing,
1998; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Brewer, 1979; Brown, 1995). These associations are stronger the
more one identifies with his/her ethnic/racial/social groups. This means that the stronger an
individual adheres to national, ethnic, or social group identification, the more likely he or she is
to feel unfavorable toward out-group members. This line of thinking is consistent with the
similarity-attraction hypothesis (Byrne, 1971), which states that individuals who are perceived to
be similar to the assessor will be evaluated positively. Recent studies have used this hypothesis
to explain why individuals are more likely to appreciate others who possess the same
characteristics as the in-group (van Oudenhoven, Judd, & Hewstone, 2000). Research shows that
certain immigrant groups are more or less likely to be accepted in society because of perceived
similarities or cultural distances between their selves (minority/out-group) and the host society
(Berry, 2006; Ho, Niles, Penney, Thomas, 1994). These studies reveal positive attitudes toward
out-group members who are seen to possess cultural characteristics similar to the in-group.
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Another approach to being accepted in group relations is intergroup emotion theory. This
theory focuses on the idea that group membership is an integral part of the self (Turner et al.
1987). Salient group memberships allow members of a group to see themselves as exemplars of
that group, as opposed to being unique individuals (Miller, Smith and Mackie 2004). As a result,
the group becomes emotionally significant to the individual. Individuals then view members of
the out-group as someone/something threatening to the in-group, thus increasing their propensity
to be prejudicial towards out-group members.
Conversely, when the out-group is viewed positively, the individual sees the out-group
members more favorably and deserving of sympathy or empathy (Miller, Smith and Mackie
2004). Such intergroup emotion plays an important role in popular attitudes towards Arabs post9/11, as it highlights the propensity for individuals to be prejudiced toward Arabs if they are
viewed as a threat to the in-group (mainstream America).
A final variant of social identity theory involves social cohesion as a variable linking
shared identities and intergroup prejudice. Specifically, when groups perceive others as outgroup members, prejudice can increase. According to the model of group inclusion, a common
group identity can lead toward inclusion. The central idea is that once “others” are defined as
members of the in-group, they will be treated like in-group members (Gaertner & Dovidio,
2000). This model shows how representations affect intergroup conflicts once a single group is
created. The feelings of animosity by out-group members toward in-group members can become
positive through a process known as pro-in-group bias (Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, 2006).
Cognitive and motivational processes that normally lead to in-group favoritism become
redirected to improve attitudes toward the newly defined members of the in-group. Members of
different groups are not required to give up their previous group identifications, they are only
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required to “increase the salience of existing superordinate memberships (a school, company, or
nation) or by introducing factors like common goals or shared fate” (Van Oudenhoven, Judd,
Ward, 2008). In fact, individuals may be members of multiple groups simultaneously, and
therefore possess multiple identities (Brewer, 2000). A common larger identity helps reduce
prejudice, while single-group identities lend themselves to potential intergroup conflict.
Social identity theory emphasizes the role of social cohesion in intergroup relations. Once
social identities form, social cohesion increases between similar group members. This cohesion
stems from three different variables: homophily (Kandel 1978), integration (Moody 2001), and
cohesion (Moody and White 2003). The first variation of social cohesion research focuses on
the concepts of friendship, selection, and socialization. Kandel (1978) examined these concepts
early on in conjunction with Lazarsfeld and Merton’s (1954) concept of homophily. Homophily
is the tendency of individuals to affiliate with those who are like them. Friendships influence not
only whom one associates with, but also other decisions about whom to affiliate with (Kandel
1978: 433). Kandel states that homophily influences relationships involving the actions of
friends and the actor’s beliefs. If actions are not congruent with beliefs one may break off the
friendship and find another friend, or change one’s behavior to conform to that of the friend
(Kandel 1978: 435). According to Kandel, similar individuals seem to think and act alike to form
social groups. This informs our argument in that social groups that are similar may gain power
through pursuing their own interests in the social realm (Domhoff 2002: 290); therefore, if one
does not belong to the group that is in power, he or she will have the possibility of being
perceived as “lower-class” or “lower-than” those who have gained power through their strong
ties. For Kandel this represents a combination of homophily and social cohesion.
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Moody and White also discuss how aspects of homophily and integration affect social
cohesion. Collective groups participate in the larger social structure through common
connections that allow them to influence and participate as a collective in society. In looking
cohesion in conjunction with racial/ethnic groups, we see that some groups are more able to
participate in the social arena than others. This conjunction also helps us understand how
interaction between groups helps a group either become included or excluded in society.

The “Conceptual Arab”
Another example of social cohesion influencing group attitudes, and therefore individual
action, comes from Zygmunt Bauman’s analysis of the Holocaust during World War II in
Modernity and the Holocaust. Bauman (1989) speaks of the “Conceptual Jew” as a stereotype
sponsored by the Nazi state and often in conflict with the known Jew or particular Jew of
personal acquaintance. The increase of media attention toward Muslims created the American
“Conceptual Arab” much as Nazi propaganda created the “Conceptual Jew.” Many parallels can
be drawn between the “Conceptual Jew” and the “Conceptual Arab,” but the most pronounced
are being outside the fold, and the ramifications of being an “other.” The conceptual “other”
embodies what was to be feared or despised, and the “necessary” punishment of persons defined
within the framework “Conceptual Jew.” Bauman argues that the conceptual Jew was hated
because Jews fell outside the realm of the “cognitive clarity and moral harmony of the universe”
(Bauman 1989, 37). Jews, by virtue of believing different than traditional Christian beliefs, and
for a variety of other reasons, posed a threat to the Christian faith. This threat was personified by
the slimy, dirty, vermin-like Jew who was genetically inferior and therefore posed a threat to a
pure race by virtue of their very existence. This threatened the Christian’s way of life similar to
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how being Japanese during WWII or being Muslim after 9/11 has been constructed to threaten
the American way of life.
Shortly after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, President Roosevelt issued
an executive order giving authority to the Secretary of War to remove any individuals that could
be perceived as a threat and relocate them into internment camps. Similar to the experience of
the Jews in Germany, prejudice toward Japanese-American prejudice was justified by an internal
factor, “genetics”. The American government made the American-Japanese “other –than” or
“less-than” other Euro-American descendants through highlighting the genetic differences
determined at birth, rather than ideological or learned behaviors (Bayoumi, 2006). Defining the
Japanese as “other” began long before World War II. Irons (1983) explained that anti-Japanese
sentiment began to take form in 1905 and focused on two factors—economic and moral threat.
Economic threat surfaced as and increased in intensity as Japanese farmers succeeded in carving
out a large market-share of California’s produce market. Japanese assimilation in local public
schools became construed as a moral threat to American citizens. They feared Japanese men,
lacked morals and would prey on American girls and women (Irons 1983). This association of
genetics with morality developed prejudice that was characterized by the media as the “Yellow
Peril”. Anti-Japanese sentiment developed overtime and culminated in the internment of
thousands. Similarly, anti-Muslim and Arab sentiment grew in the US overtime and culminated
with Arab and Muslim arrests and deportation post 9/11.
In a similar way the US government highlighted the “otherness” of Muslim Americans in
2002 when it required nonimmigrant males to register their location, effectively leading to
deportation proceedings of fourteen thousand people (Bayoumi, 2006). This defined them as
“others,” people who needed to be feared and despised. Government action subsequently
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transitioned to the private sector, from institutionalized to overt discrimination. In the first 13
months following the 9/11 attacks, 80 Arab American passengers were removed from airplanes
across the country for being Muslim or having Arab sounding names (Ibish, 2003). This
institutionalized discrimination showed the American people that one’s last name separated one
from those who were “American,” and that persons with Arab names were not to be trusted;
rather, they should be feared.
American Islamophobia culminated in the aftermath of 9/11, yet some scholars argue that
popular negative views toward this group of people have been embedded in our group psyche
since the beginning of American cinema. Shaheen analyzes 1,000 feature films that portray any
form of Arab personage (Shaheen 2009, 7). Twenty-five percent of the “negative” films include
racial slurs about Arabs, and often portray those individuals as the objects of a cheap joke
(Shaheen 2006). Shaheen notes the parallel of the Jewish and Arab experience in racist
propaganda films. Jews were once viewed as the “other,” now, the characterization of what is
other and therefore a threat to the American way of life, is, in fact, the Hollywood depiction of
the modern Arab (Shaheen 2009, 11). “Yesteryears lecherous Jew is today’s hook-nosed Arab,
arousing fear in the Aryan or pure races” (Shaheen 2009, 11-12). Shaheen argues that prejudice
toward this group of people is part of our shared American psyche, fostered and maintained by
the Hollywood media. Fear and the sense of “otherness” paved the way for overt prejudicial acts
toward the “conceptual Muslim or Arab” through print and visual media.
Given our discussion thus far, it should be no surprise that in 2006 a USA Today/Gallup
Poll highlighted the fact that 39 percent of Americans admitted to holding prejudice toward
Muslim Americans (Elias 2006). While America in 2000 was vastly different than Germany in
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the 1930, negative feelings about Muslims seem to parallel what Bauman observed in the Jewish
experience during WWII:
“Many Germans welcomed the measures portrayed as the punishment of the Jew
(as long as one could pretend that the punished was indeed the conceptual Jew)
as an imaginary (yet plausible) solution to quite real (if subconscious) anxieties
and fears of displacement and insecurity” (Bauman 1989:75).
Similarly, Americans’ attitudes regarding the punishment of Muslims and Arabs post-9/11
revolve around the notion of a “conceptual Arab” or “conceptual Muslim.” This “conceptual
Muslim” is not someone one knows; instead it is an image or concept that causes uneasiness and
apprehension. Fictionalized formulations of Muslims and Arabs, whether realized or not, have
helped to create a sense of “otherness” about Muslim Americans through various mediums.

Media
The impact that the media has on public perception of Muslims/Arabs post-9/11 is one
final factor. Articles and books on this subject have centered on fear (Nacos& Torres-Reyna,
2007; Norris, Kern, Just, 2003; Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, Vermeulen, 2009), the
difference between Islam and regular society (Said, 1981), and Islamophobia (Saeed, 2007;
Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008; Shooman & Spielhaus, 2010). Aside from specialized topics, the
overarching theme is that the media has helped fuel anti-Muslim or anti-Arab attitudes in
America and abroad (Norris, Kern, Just, 2003; Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008; Das, Bushman,
Bezemer, Kerkhof, Vermuelen, 2009). Of all the information found in these writings, the data
most pertinent to the present study is found in a content analysis of American news media pre
and post 9/11.
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Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2007) show how the news media may frame public perception
over time. They conducted a content analysis of articles and pictures published in popular news
sources six months pre- and post-9/11. Not surprisingly, the number of articles using the word
“Muslim” increased in the New York Times from 345 to 1,468 articles between six months and
one year after the 9/11 attack. Similar increases were found when including “Arab” (345
increased to 1,272) or “Islam” (216 increased to 1,190) as the topic of analysis. Even greater
increases appeared in the news media. News segments about Muslims on CNN increased from
23 segments pre-9/11 to 203 post-9/11. Once again, similar increases were noted for the
keywords “Arab” (43 pre-9/11 to 200 post-9/11) and “Islam” (1 pre-9/11 to 46 post-9/11). Nacos
and Torres-Reyna also studied the effect that this increase had on negative Arab/Muslim
attitudes. Most of the articles and news reports focused on opinions about Muslims rather than
informative pieces aimed at understanding the Muslim minority group. This focus on opinion
rather than fact may have contributed to the reported eight percent decrease in positive news
stories about Muslim and Arab Americans from six months to one year after 9/11, as compared
to a sixteen percent increase in negative news stories for the same time period (Nacos and
Torres-Reyna 2007, 8, 27).
Finally, Nacos and Torres-Reyna show how mainstream Americans were not only
exposed to increased numbers of news stories in newspapers and other news media, but also in
popular news-magazines. Their study of visual portrayals of Muslims and Arabs in print media
shows a striking increase in the number of pictorial representations in Time Magazine and
Newsweek from 9 to 76. In addition to the increase in visual representations, Nacos and TorresReyna coded the pictures and found that pictorial representations of Muslims and Arabs in Time
Magazine six months after 9/11 were 50% positive, 25% neutral, and 25% negative. Pictures in
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Newsweek were found to be 40% neutral and 60% negative (Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2007, 41).
Clearly, the media, whether written, spoken, or visual has the potential to exacerbate unfavorable
intergroup attitudes.

Hypotheses
Two hypotheses stem from the preceding literature review. The first is based on the
social contact literature; I posit that individuals will have experienced more contact (and
information from the media) with Arab/Muslim people post 9/11, and subsequently have
decreased favorable attitudes toward Arab Americans and Arabs in general. I postulate this
decrease of favorable attitudes can be attributed to three elements of the social contact theory
that were discussed in the literature review, namely intergroup emotion theory, personal
prejudice, and imagined social contact. These variant aspects of the larger contact theory
umbrella enable us to understand why mainstream American citizens might see Arab/Muslim
individuals as a threat to their in-group and the status quo, thus leading to increased negative
attitudes. This fundamental hypothesis is the opposite of traditional Contact theory; but I argue
that the imagined social contact is a key element producing the anticipated result. Many
individuals in the United States have had more contact since 9/11 with members of the
Arab/Muslim ethnicity (imagined or real), than before. Many of these contact situations have
been in a negative context (9/11, media, political groups, family/friends, etc.), which suggests
increased negative attitudes and decreased liking.
The second hypothesis is derived from social identity theory and posits that variables
relevant to identity may increase favorable attitudes toward members of the Arab/Muslim
ethnicity. This relationship is best explained by two facets of the social identity ideology, social
cohesion and common in-group identity. From the social cohesion literature we understand that
15

individuals seek to befriend those who are like themselves. In combining this with the common
in-group identity theory we can see how increased liking toward an out-group by in-group
members can lead to acceptance of out-group members into the in-group, and decreased negative
attitudes (increased liking). Such in-group/out-group influences may heighten negative
perceptions. The “conceptual Muslim” perspective is relevant here. Individuals who feel
Muslims and Arabs are similar in thought and action to how they themselves think and act are
less influenced by society’s (e.g., the media) view of what a Muslim or Arab is and their
subsequent social stigmas. I predicted that in-group mainstream Americans who are able to
positively identify with the out-group (Arab/Muslims) will have an increased positive attitude
toward that ethnic group between 2001 and 2009.
Data and Methods

Survey Methodology
I will now describe my data set, the methodological framework, and the statistical
regression that will allow us to clarify the relationship between social contact, social identity, and
attitudes toward Muslim/Arab Americans post-9/11. I used two samples from the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press (Mid-November survey 2001 and August 2009). Both studies
are nationally representative telephone surveys conducted in English by the Princeton Data
Source, LLC. The research methodology for the two surveys is the same. I will describe the
survey methodology for both and then explain the specific data that I use from each survey.
Each of these samples is based in a telephone survey that used list-assisted random digit
dialing (RDD) methodology in order to obtain a fair sample of home, cell, and unlisted numbers.
This sampling technique allowed the surveyors to use “active blocks of telephone numbers (area

16

code + exchange+ two-digit block number) that contained three or more residential directory
listings that were equally likely to be selected; after selection two more digits were added
randomly to complete the number” (Princeton Survey Research Associates International, 2009).
Through this method, the Pew Center was able to ensure that they were able to reach “every
assigned phone number regardless of whether that number is directory listed, purposely unlisted,
or too new to be listed” (Princeton Survey Research Associates International, 2005). Once the
numbers were selected, they were compared against business directories and any matching
numbers were purged from the survey.
As many as 7-9 attempts were made to contact every number in the sample, and the calls
were staggered over different times of day and different days of the week in order to maximize
the likelihood of contacting the potential respondents. The methodology for landline and cell
phone calls differed slightly. For landline calls, once the interviewer contacted the household,
they asked to speak to the youngest adult male (18 or older) that was currently home. If there
was no male, the interviewer then asked to speak with either the youngest or oldest female at
home based on a random rotation. This research methodology has been shown to produce
samples that closely mirror the population in terms of age and gender. Cellular phone calls
differed in that the interview was conducted with the person who answered the phone. Due to
concerns that a cellular interview might use up respondents’ minutes, post-paid cash incentives
were offered for their participation.

Sample
Each survey was conducted within a predetermined timeframe (November 13-19, 2001;
August 11-17, 2009). Both samples have a similar number of nationally representative
respondents (November 2001, n= 1500, August 2009 n= 2010).
17

Multiple Surveys
The surveys contain different questions, but the question wording and question order for
the variables in this study are consistent over both surveys. Regardless of the questions that were
asked or the time in which they were asked, these data are capable of functioning and providing
relevant analysis to the issue. I will: 1.) Look at factors leading to positive/negative attitudes
(social contact, social identity, control variables), 2.) View changes in attitudes over time, 3.)
Attempt to interpret variations in negative/positive attitudes over time.

Dependent Variable
The primary dependent variable is attitudes toward Muslim Americans post 9/11. This
variable refers to the respondents’ overall attitudes toward Muslim Americans and is coded as a
categorical variable (1= Never heard of/ Can’t rate, 2=Unfavorable, 3=Favorable). Respondents
who identified as members of the Islamic religion were not asked this question, so as to not bias
the data. Two categories, never heard of and can’t rate, were combined to generate a larger
comparison sample in addition to capturing any responses that would be lost from an inability to
rate their feelings toward Muslim Americans. Several independent variables included in the
model; they are discussed below.

Independent Variables: November 2001
This first survey will serve as the base measurements for both the social contact and
social identity questions. The variables I will use in this survey for the social contact model are:
respondents’ feelings towards Muslim’s (1= Never heard of/ Can’t rate, 2=Unfavorable,
3=Favorable), and whether respondents actually know any Muslims (No-Yes, 0-1). The contact
literature argues that these variables reveal actual contact (knowing Muslims), a key variable
affecting attitudes. It would have been useful to include how much the respondents know about
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the Muslim religion and its practices (a great deal-nothing at all), but this question was not asked
in 2009 and therefore cannot be used.
Also in this survey are our comparison-group variables for the social identity model,
namely whether the respondents think that their religion and the religion of Islam are similar or
different (Don’t know/Different- Similar, 0-1). This question is significant to social identity
theory in that it establishes whether the respondent is able to see those involved in the Islamic
religion as either within their own in-group or outside of it. It was only asked of respondents not
of Islamic religion.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Independent Variables: August 2009
The subsequent August 2009 survey enables us to compare the social contact and social
identity results from the November 2001 survey to responses eight years later. This latter survey
contains the same questions (and wordings) as the 2001 study. The variables used for both
theoretical models from this survey are: the respondents’ feelings towards Muslims (1= Never
heard of/ Can’t rate, 2=Unfavorable, 3=Favorable), whether the respondents actually know any
Muslims (No-Yes, 0-1), and whether those surveyed think that their religion and the Muslim
religion are similar or different (1-4). Responses for this question were combined (from 1-4 to 01) to reflect the coding for the November 2001 survey (Don’t know/Different- Similar, 0-1). I
included the following control variables: gender, age, education, ethnicity, income, and religion.
This survey also includes the questions about the name for the Muslim God and the name
for the Muslim equivalent of the Bible, both of which would be helpful when trying to
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understand exactly how much an individual knows about (perceived contact) the Muslim
religion, but sadly those questions were not asked in 2001.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Control Variables
Both surveys include all the pertinent control variables (gender, age, education, ethnicity,
income, and religion) for both the social contact and social identity models (see Table 1). The
effect that gender has on attitudes has been examined by several researchers. Some argue that
different socializing factors affecting men and women cause women to have more favorable
racial attitudes (Johnson and Marini, 1998). Other researchers (Hughes and Tauch, 2003) have
found gender differences in racial attitudes to be slight and mostly affected when racial policy
issues are considered. It will be useful to include gender in my model to measure in case gender
differences are present.
I will also include age in my model as it is has been found to be negatively associated
with racial tolerance (Johnson and Jacobson, 2005). Researchers have found that generally it is
the youngest generations that are the most favorable to integration (Orfield, 1995) and therefore
are more likely to have positive feelings toward out-group racial members. Researchers also have
found that higher levels of education are associated with racial integration acceptance (Schuman
et al. 1997; Johnson and Jacobson, 2005). I include ethnicity and income as control variables to
explore realistic conflict theory. This theory suggests that African Americans, Asian Americans,
and the other ethnicities polled in this survey would have more favorable attitudes and less
unfavorable attitudes compared to the majority Caucasian ethnic group. Income is also related to
group conflict over the competition for resources (i.e. jobs). Brown (2000) associates hiring
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practices with racial antagonism as multiple racial groups struggle to obtain similar jobs.
Increased levels of income protect individuals from this form of market competition and thus
lead to more tolerant attitudes toward minority groups (Kunovich, 2004).
Religion is the final control variable included in the two models. Researchers have found
that religion enables groups to create boundaries (Edgell and Tranby 2010) as well as create a
sense of “otherness” (Edgell, Geretis, and Hartmann, 2006) that differentiates other religions
from the mainstream Judo-Christian America. Jung (2012) has found that one’s religion
significantly affects the respect they give other religions (i.e. Christianity v. Islam) and as a result
has the ability to affect racial attitudes toward the Muslim ethnic group. The Pew data categorize
religion into five groups: Protestant (Baptist, Methodist, Non-Denominational, Lutheran,
Presbyterian, Pentecostal, Episcopalian, Reformed, Church of Christ, Jehovah’s Witness, etc.),
Roman Catholic, Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints/LDS), Orthodox (Greek,
Russian, or some other orthodox church), and other. I will separate these groups in my analyses.

Data Analysis
I used a multinomial logistic model, as this approach is the most useful when analyzing a
categorical dependent variable with three response categories. Another reason I chose to use this
regression is because it allows me to use odds ratios from the relative risk ratio output measures,
which I can then transform with the percent change formula. This enables me to state that the
odds are that one group is X percent more likely to have a favorable or unfavorable attitude,
which will aid in my reporting and understanding the findings of this analysis.
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Results

Cross Tabulations- Contact and Attitudes
Tables three and four show a 6% increase (42%-48%) in the number of respondents who
said they actually knew someone who is a Muslim. This increase, in the same tables, is coupled
with a 17% increase (17%-33%) in overall negative feelings toward Muslim Americans. Looking
at contact and attitudes in 2001, only 12% of respondents who said they actually knew a MuslimAmerican said that they had unfavorable feelings toward that ethnic group. By 2009 that
proportion had increased to 29%.

[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Likewise, the percentage of those who said they knew a Muslim and were favorable
toward Muslim Americans dropped from 77% in 2001 to 55% in 2009. When contact is removed
from the analysis, we observe overall favorable attitudes decreasing from 64% favorable in 2001
to 44% favorable in 2009. At the same time unfavorable attitudes increased from 17% to 33%.
Unfavorable attitudes increased for both groups that did and did not know Muslim
Americans in 2001 and 2009. First, those respondents who knew Muslim Americans and had
unfavorable attitudes toward them rose from 12% in 2001 to 29% in 2009. Clearly contact theory
is not working in its tradition sense that we might expect—that contact leads to more favorable
attitudes. Second, we see that for those respondents who do not know Muslims, their unfavorable
attitudes rose from 21% in 2001 to 37% in 2009.
The inability of respondents to rate their feelings toward Muslim Americans increased for
both groups, whether or not they had contact with the group. Eleven percent of respondents that
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had contact with Muslim Americans in 2001 felt they could not rate their attitude toward that
group. That percentage increased to 16% in 2009. Similarly 25% respondents that did not have
any contact with Muslim Americans in 2001 did not rate their attitude in 2001. In 2009, that
percentage rose to 29%.
Overall, for the data in tables three and four, the proportion of people who actually knew
Muslims had increased, but so did the proportion harboring unfavorable attitudes toward them.
This finding is contrary to the fundamental assumptions of contact theory, and forces us to
reexamine its applicability in this case.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Cross Tabulations-Identity and Attitudes
Tables five and six reveal that the percentage of individuals who believed that their
religion and the Muslim religion were similar decreased dramatically, from 35% to 18% between
2001 and 2009. Correspondingly, respondents who felt their religion and that of Islam was
different increased from 65% in 2001 to 82% in 2009.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Even though the percentage of those who said their religion and the Muslim religion were
similar decreased over time, the percentage of those who thought their religion and the Muslim
religion were similar and were favorable toward the Muslim religion dropped moderately (85%
in 2001 v. 68% in 2009). A similar drop in favorable attitudes occurred between those who
indicated that they didn’t think their religion and that of Islam were similar: from 53% favorable
in 2001 to 37% favorable in 2009.
Respondents who identified with the Muslim religion and still had negative attitudes
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toward Muslims increased from 5% in 2001 to 18% in 2009. For those that didn’t identify their
religion and that of Islam similar, their unfavorable attitudes rose from 23% in 2001 to 38% in
2009. The inability to rate one’s attitudes stayed almost constant between both groups of social
identity respondents in 2001 and 2009. For those that did religiously identify with Muslims, the
inability to rate increased from 10% in 2001 to 14% in 2009. Individuals who did not identify
with the Islamic religion and could not rate their attitudes was essentially the same: 24% in 2001
to 25% in 2009.
These initial results are very similar to those in the contact theory case, which suggests
contact and identity perform similar functions in relation to attitudes toward ethnic/racial groups.
A multinomial logistic regression will help us understand how, if at all, contact and social
identity variables affect attitudinal outcomes.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

Regression Outcomes- Contact and Attitudes
The multinomial logistic regression gives us more insight into the complexity of contact
and its affect on personal attitudes. The results in Table 7 (for the year 2001) indicate, quite
clearly, that actually knowing a Muslim is associated with an increase in positive attitudes. Our
data show that the odds for respondents who actually know a Muslim American are over twice
(2.26) as likely to have positive feelings toward this ethnic group, when compared those who
either don’t know or can’t rate their opinion of Muslim Americans. The relationship between
contact and negative attitudes, compared for those that cannot rate/don’t know Muslims, is not
significant in 2001. This suggests that contact does not affect negative attitudes, or it could be
that other mediating factors, such as sustained contact or media influence, were not as prevalent
in November 2001.
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Other variables that significantly affect ones’ propensity to be favorable toward Muslim
Americans in 2001 are age, gender, and race. For every one-year increase in age, I observed an
associated 0.99 decrease in the odds of favorable attitudes toward to increase Muslim Americans.
This variable is not significant in looking at unfavorable attitudes. The second control variable
that is significant in 2001 is gender, but it is only significant when looking at those who hold a
negative opinion. The regression analysis shows that the odds for women are 0.58 times less
likely to have a negative opinion as opposed to not being able to rate/don’t know Muslim
Americans. This finding could be due to the fact that women are more other-orientated, yet the
affect that their gender has on racial attitudes has been found to be minute (Hughes and Tauch,
2003).
The final significant factor in favorable attitudes is race. I broke this category down by
ethnicity so that I could compare attitudes between the four ethnic groups. According to our data
the odds for African-Americans are 0.51 less likely to favorably rate Arab-Americans, when
compared to White respondents. The odds for Asians to rate Arab-Americans favorably are 0.77
more likely than White respondents. Finally, the odds those grouped into the “other race”
category are 0.54 more likely to rate Arab-Americans as favorable, when compared to White
respondents. Similarly, the odds for some “other race” group are 0.38 less likely to rate ArabAmericans as unfavorable, when compared to White respondents. This is very interesting as
these results to do not fall in line with traditional race-relation theory. According to realistic
conflict theory, White respondents would be more likely to hold favorable attitudes; we observe
this relationship in our data. These trends must be explored further by incorporating the results
from the 2009 data.
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
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In 2009, we observe similar effects of contact theory variables and the odds that a
respondent will have either favorable or unfavorable attitude toward Muslims. Once again,
actually knowing a Muslim is positively related to the odds for positive attitudes. The odds for
those respondents who state they know Muslim Americans are 2.26 times more as likely to have
positive feelings compared to those that cannot rate/don’t know Muslim Americans. Conversely,
the odds for respondents that state they have contact with Muslim Americans are 1.45 times
more likely to have negative feelings compared to not being able to rate or having no opinion.
These results suggest that contact affects both positive and negative attitudes, but the strongest
relationship is on positive attitudes. It is interesting to note that while overall negative feelings
rose between 2001 and 2009, the data show that knowing a Muslim American is still strongly
associated with positive feelings as opposed to non-response. Contact is significant in 2009 for
both positive and negative feelings, while in 2001 contact was only significant when looking at
positive feelings. This could be due to a few different factors; 1.) Contact is polarizing in that
individuals have either negative or positive feelings, not an inability to rate their feelings; 2.)
Contact, whether imagined or actual, has also increased over time; the increase in contact and
negative attitudes decreases the likelihood that one would have positive attitudes in 2009. Further
information for both these explanations will be understood in the discussion.
The August 2009 control variable results differ from those in 2001 in that age, education,
and income make the odds for respondents more likely to have a favorable attitude toward
Muslim Americans. None of these control variables are significant in looking at the association
between contact and negative attitudes. The data for favorable attitudes shows that age is once
again significant, and illustrates that every one-year increase is associated with the odds being
0.99 times less likely to have favorable attitudes when compared to those have never heard of
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Muslim Americans or be unable to rate Muslim Americans. This regression also shows that for
every one-unit increase in a respondents’ education level, the odds are 1.10 times more likely
that the respondent will have a favorable attitude, compared to respondents who cannot
rate/don’t know. Income results are also significant in 2009, and show that increased levels of
income are associated with the odds of a respondent being 1.00 times more likely to have
favorable attitudes as opposed to not being able to rate their feelings toward Muslim Americans.
This result is very interesting when considering group-conflict. It could be that higher income
respondents do not see Muslim Americans as a fiscal threat, or higher income could be
associated with other positive factors, such as education or contact. The effects of other control
variables in the 2009 survey are not significant. More detail of the contact results will be
discussed in the next section; first I must look at how identity affects attitudes and then reconcile
all information from both regressions in the discussion.
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
The lack of significance between contact and negative attitudes in 2001 could be
attributed to the strength of contact on attitudes in general, or the relationship between contact,
and the comparison between no opinion/inability to rate and negative attitudes. To further
explore this relationship, an additional regression was employed, this time looking at contact and
attitudes with negative attitudes as the comparison group. From this table, I observed that contact
is significant in both 2001 and 2009 when looking at the change from negative to positive
attitudes toward Muslim Americans. In 2001, the odds for respondents that had contact with
Muslim Americans were 55 percent more likely to have positive feelings toward this group,
when compared to those respondents that had a negative attitude toward the Muslim ethnicity.
Similarly, in 2009 the odds for respondents that said they knew Muslim Americans were 1.45
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times more likely to have positive as opposed to negative attitudes toward this ethnicity. It is
clear, that contact is important both in 2001 and 2009 when looking at positive and negative
attitudes toward Muslim Americans. Possibilities for the insignificance of negative attitudes in
2001 will be considered in the discussion section.
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]

Regression Outcomes-Identity and Attitudes
The results for identity and attitudes using the November 2001 data support social
identity theory by showing that individuals who identify with Muslims have favorable attitudes
toward Muslim Americans. In 2001, our data shows that the odds for respondents that say their
religion and that of Islam are similar are 2.44 times more likely to have positive feelings toward
Muslim Americans, as opposed to those that can’t rate/don’t know this group. The odds for
respondents who identify with Muslims are 0.33 times less likely to have negative feelings
toward Muslim Americans. It is interesting to note how attitudes change in 2009 when
respondents are less likely to feel that their religion and that of Islam is similar.
In 2009 I observed the odds of a respondent who identifies his or her religion and that of
Islam to be similar are over 2.34 times more as likely to have positive feelings toward Muslim
Americans, when compared to those who don’t see their religions as similar. The association
between identity and negative feelings is not significant in 2009.
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
Discussion

Limitations
The study has significant limitations. The first is that the data are not longitudinal and

therefore the changes are not changes of the same people. The second limitation is that the two
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samples are drawn from the same population and are nationally representative. Therefore the
differences suggest that the population itself has changed from 2001 and 2009. Second, the
measurements of the independent variables are not as precise as one might want. For instance, it
would have been more beneficial to ask what type of contact the respondents had with Muslims
and the frequency of that contact. Other research has measured contact using frequency of
contact (how often have the respondents spoken to a Muslim in a 12 month period) (Jung,
2012), while others have measured contact on a 1-6 scale from no contact to a lot (Khan &
Pederson, 2010) or even a 1-10 scale counting the number of out-group interactions in the six
months before the survey (Barlow, Louis, and Hewstone, 2009). A measure of contact other than
our dichotomous variable would have been more powerful in explaining attitudinal results as it
would help show how the different amount of contact affects attitudes.

Contact and Attitudes
The findings support my first hypothesis in that both measures of social contact and
unfavorable attitudes have increased from 2001 to 2009, yet we do not note the inverse of
contact theory occurring in this data set. Overall, there was a 29 percent difference in negative
feelings between 2001 and 2009. Statistically, the multinomial logistic regression shows that
between 2001 and 2009 the odds for individuals who have contact with Muslim Americans were
2.26 times more likely in 2001 and 2.35 times more likely in 2009 to have positive feelings when
compared to those who could not rate Muslims, or had no attitude toward them. The influence
contact has on the likelihood that a respondent has negative feelings is only significant in 2009,
thus the ability to view the inverse of contact theory evaporates. What we can understand in
these data sets is the polarizing affect that contact has on attitudes when we analyze the change
from no opinion to positive feelings. One possible explanation for this polarizing affect could be
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due to imagined social contact through various media sources.
Contact theory predicts that prejudicial attitudes decline as; 1.) one’s knowledge of the
out-group increases, 2.) one’s anxiety about intergroup contact decreases, and 3.) one’s empathy
toward the out-group member and perspective increases (Pettigrew & Tropp 2008). Yet in this
case only two of the three causal mechanisms seem to be occurring. The data clearly show that
knowing more about Muslims, is not necessarily associated with less anxiety about intergroup
contact or experience, or increased empathy toward the Muslim minority group. This finding
may be attributed to imagined social contact and the affect it has on personal feelings (Crisp and
Turner 2009). If respondents imagined the events of September 11, 2001, to be akin to an actual
interaction between them and the Muslim minority group, then it follows that the respondents
will harbor negative attitudes toward that group of people.
It seems evident from the cross-tabs that social contact is not always able to reduce
prejudice through increased knowledge and anxiety about intergroup contact (Pettigrew & Tropp
2008). In fact, it may actually contribute unfavorable feelings. Yet this is not supported in the
multi-nominal regression. Based on our literature review and analysis of these data, it seems
most likely due to the media’s ability to influence public perception. We have observed that both
measures of contact (Pew Studies) and negative media stories (Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2007, 8)
have increased.
What seems most important when seeking to understand this relationship is the type of
contact that occurs between the Muslims and majority group members, and how group members
perceive and process these interactions. Media spin and public perception go hand in hand. The
increased negative news stories after 9/11 have subsequently promoted the “Reel Bad Arab”
persona, leading to less social cohesion between the in- and out-groups and spurring negative
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intergroup attitudes. Through the media, mainstream America has conceptualized the Muslim or
Arab as someone to be feared, distrusted, and separated from.
Studies where contact effect attitudes involve the types contact (real or imagined) and the
outcome of those situations (positive or negative). Turner and Crisp (2010) found that
individuals who had imagined contact with a Muslim stranger showed significantly less bias
toward non-Muslims as opposed to Muslims. This phenomenon exists outside of the Muslim
experience, and can be observed with other minority/ethnic or social groups (Turner, Crisp, and
Lambert, 2007; Abrams et al.2008). Barlow et al. (2013) showed the significance of the types of
contact relationships by focusing on the affect that both positive and negative interactions had on
out-group attitudes. They found that the association between negative contact and therefore
negative attitudes to be more consistent than positive attitudes affecting positive attitudes.
Regardless of whether contact is imagined or real, contact is most important when viewing the
types of interactions between in-group and out-group members.
While these contact theory results support to our hypothesis, our social identity results are
somewhat surprising. While the data seem to show, at least overall in cross-tabulations, that the
inverse of what social contact theory predicted was occurring, the data for social identity theory
tend to fall in line with mainstream theory—and my second hypothesis.

Social Identity and Attitudes
My second hypothesis, that social identity theory is able to increase the likelihood of
favorable attitudes, proves correct. In 2001, the odds for individuals who felt that their religion
and that of Islam was similar were 2.44 times more likely to have a favorable opinion when
compared to respondents that have no opinion or can’t rate Muslim Americans. In 2009, the odds
of respondents who identified with the religion of Islam were 2.34 times more likely to have
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favorable feelings. Several factors can be attributed to the strength of the relationship between
identity and attitudes becoming slightly weaker in 2009 than 2001, many of which are inherent in
the theory.
Berry (2006), Ho, Niles, Penney, and Thomas (1994) and Jung (2012) suggest that the
greater the perceived cultural difference between the host and immigrant group, the less
accepting the host society is of that group. The slight difference in favorable attitudes across time
could once again be due to overall increased media coverage, and specifically increased negative
news media stories and articles (Nacos and Torres Reyna, 2007). We can also see the effects of
social cohesion and its ability to positively impact the measured relationship between attitudes
and identity. This means that individuals who relate to the Muslim ethnicity are significantly
more likely to have positive attitudes, as compared to those who cannot rate/don’t know Muslim
Americans. I have observed overall levels of religious identification of respondents toward the
religion of Islam to decline; this leads to less cohesion between the groups and therefore a
decreased propensity to have favorable attitudes. Through understanding both social contact and
social identity’s ability to influence attitudes post-9/11, I turn to possible theory implications in
order to place our results in context.

Theory Implications
It is obvious that these results have implications for both contact theory and social
identity theory. Analyses including social contact and social identity variables yielded statistical
results about favorable attitudes toward Muslim Americans that are significant at the .001 level.
This shows that both theories are integrally related to research on race and ethnic relations. For
our study, we found that social contact measurements yielded greater likelihood of favorable
attitudes, suggesting that favorable attitudes toward Muslim Americans after 9/11 can be
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understood by employing a theory that measures how much contact the respondent has with
those of the Muslim/Arab ethnicity.
One cannot forget, however, how compelling the evidence was in this case for the inverse
of contact theory. Our data have shown that in the Muslim experience after 9/11, to know this
group is to actually like them less—based on aggregate data. This suggests that there are
implications from this case that those who use contact theory must include in their studies. From
our literature review and case study I would suggest that researchers seeking to use contact
theory should also include measurements of that specific groups’ treatment in the mainstream
media. Widespread negative accounts will obviously lead to not only increased negative opinions
but also, most likely, an increased amount of individuals who feel that they “know” members of
that ethnic or racial group. Our modern age, so immersed in technology, has the ability to affect
millions of attitudes with a single news article or “viral video.” The concept of “knowing” has
evolved from sustained person-to-person contact to knowing what we, as a society, have
conjured up as the “conceptual Muslim” or the “conceptual Jew.” If we use these societal
definitions to determine what we know about a group of people and therefore how we think and
act toward them, we are really only perpetuating decades old racial thinking.
Changing attitudes, I argue, should be focused on educating people about the difference
between the actual and “conceptual” models of various racial and ethnic groups. Increased
awareness of factual beliefs and actions is, in my opinion, the best method to break down the
barriers and negative standpoint that many mainstream news outlets has created. If an increased
effort is not made, we will continue to live in the ignorant state of knowing what it means to be a
“Muslim”, “Arab”, or even “American.” Left unchecked, all racial retribution that is allotted to
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those conceptualized groups will continue to perpetuate the racial and ethnic divide that scholars
of racial and ethnic studies have been trying to close for over half a century.
One aim of this study has always been to contrast social contact and identity theories in
an effort to understand racial attitudes shortly after 9/11/2001 and eight years later. From our
analysis, it is quite evident that each theory informs us of specific aspects of the overall
intergroup relation experience. While one has the ability to inform the possible affect of how the
media we consume informs public opinion, the other shows how our very private fundamental
opinions shape our public attitudes. Above all, our results show that different theories give us
insight to intricacies of a complex issue that cannot be fully understood in a vacuum. Only
through applying multiple methods for understanding are we able to begin to comprehend the
choices that at times can change our individual and collective worldviews.
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Table 1- Descriptive Statistics, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press- Mid-November
Survey 2001
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Range

Code

Dependent Variable
Attitudes2

2.45

.80

1-3

1= Never heard of/can’t rate, 2=
unfavorable, 3= favorable

.41

.49

0-1

0= No; 1= Yes

.34

.47

0-1

0= Different/Don’t know; 1=
Similar

Age

45.38

17.47

18-99

Race

1.30

.74

1-4

1= White; 2= Black or AfricanAmerican; 3= Asian or AsianAmerican; 4= Some other race

Gender

.52

.50

0-1

0= Male; 1= Female

Independent
Variables

Contact TheoryKnow Muslim

Self-IdentityIdentity2

Control Variables-

44

Education

4.18

1.67

1-7

1=None, or Grade 1-8; 2= High
School Incomplete (Grades 911); 3= High School Graduate
(Grade 12 or GED Certificate);
4= Technical, trade, or
vocational school After high
school); 5= Some college,
associate degree, no 4- year
degree; 6= Come graduate
(B.S.; B.A.; or other 4-year
degree); 7= Post- Graduate
training or professional
schooling after college

Religion

2.01

1.45

1-5

1= Protestant (Baptist,
Methodist, NonDenominational. Lutheran,
Presbyterian, Pentecostal,
Episcopalian, Reformed, Church
of Christ, Jehovah’s Witness,
etc.); 2= Roman Catholic
(Catholic); 3= Mormon (Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints/LDS) 4= Orthodox
(Greek, Russian, or some other
orthodox church); 5= Other

Income

4.52

2.21

1-8

1= Less than $10,000; 2= 10 to
under $20,000; 3= 20 to under
$30,000; 4= 30 to under
$40,000; 5= 40 to under
$50,000; 6= 50 to under
$75,000; 7= 75 to under
$100,000; 8= $100,000 or more
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Table 2- Descriptive Statistics, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, August
2009
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Range

Code

Dependent Variable
Attitudes2

2.20

.79

1-3

1= Never heard of/ can’t rate,
2= unfavorable, 3= favorable

.48

.50

0-1

0= No; 1= Yes

.17

.38

0-1

0= Different/ Don’t know; 1=
Similar

Age

51.78

17.87

18-99

Race

1.30

.75

1-4

1= White; 2= Black or AfricanAmerican; 3= Asian or AsianAmerican; 4= Some other race

Gender

.56

.50

0-1

0= Male; 1= Female

Education

4.75

1.65

1-7

1=None, or Grade 1-8; 2= High
School Incomplete (Grades 911); 3= High School Graduate
(Grade 12 or GED Certificate);

Independent
Variables

Contact TheoryKnow Muslim

Self-IdentityIdentity2

Control Variables-
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4= Technical, trade, or
vocational school After high
school); 5= Some college,
associate degree, no 4- year
degree; 6= Come graduate
(B.S.; B.A.; or other 4-year
degree); 7= Post- Graduate
training or professional
schooling after college
Religion

2.46

1.73

1-5

1= Protestant (Baptist,
Methodist, NonDenominational. Lutheran,
Presbyterian, Pentecostal,
Episcopalian, Reformed,
Church of Christ, Jehovah’s
Witness, etc.); 2= Roman
Catholic (Catholic); 3=
Mormon (Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day
Saints/LDS) 4= Orthodox
(Greek, Russian, or some other
orthodox church); 5= Other

Income

5.19

2.23

1-8

1= Less than $10,000; 2= 10 to
under $20,000; 3= 20 to under
$30,000; 4= 30 to under
$40,000; 5= 40 to under
$50,000; 6= 50 to under
$75,000; 7= 75 to under
$100,000; 8= $100,000 or more
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Table 3: Cross Tabulation of Attitudes and Contact- November 2001 Survey

Attitudes

Does not know Muslims- 0

Knows Muslims-1 Total Percentage

1- Never Heard of/
Can't rate

211 (25%)

66 (11%)

277

19%

2- Unfavorable

171 (21%)

72 (12%)

243

17%

3- Favorable

450 (54%)

456 (77%)

906

64%

832

594

1426

58%

42%

Total
Percentage

Table 4: Cross Tabulation of Attitudes and Contact- August 2009 Survey

Attitudes
1- Never Heard of/
Can't rate

Does not know Muslims- 0

Knows Muslims-1 Total Percentage

281 (29%)

145 (16%)

426

23%

2- Unfavorable

361 (37%)

258 (29%)

619

33%

3- Favorable

324 (34%)

490 (55%)

814

44%

966

893

1859

52%

48%

Total
Percentage
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Table 5: Cross Tabulation of Attitudes and Identity- November 2001 Survey

Attitudes

Don’t know/Different- 0

Similar-1 Total Percentage

1- Never Heard of/
Can't rate

204 (24%)

48 (10%)

252

19%

2- Unfavorable

199 (23%)

22 (5%)

221

17%

3- Favorable

460 (53%)

388 (85%)

848

64%

863

458

1321

65%

35%

Total
Percentage

Table 6: Cross Tabulation of Attitudes and Identity- August 2009 Survey

Attitudes

Don’t know/Different- 0

Similar-1 Total Percentage

1- Never Heard of/
Can't rate

330 (25%)

39 (14%)

369

23%

2- Unfavorable

496 (38%)

51 (18%)

547

34%

3- Favorable

486 (37%)

193 (68%)

679

43%

Total

1312

283

1595

Percentage

82%

18%
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Table 7: Multinomial Regression Predicting Attitudes due to Contact and IdentityNovember 2001 Survey
Unfavorable

Favorable

Contact

1.45

2.26 ***

Identity

0.33 ***

2.44 ***

Gender

0.58 **

0.95

Age

0.99

0.99 ***

Race

0.76 *

0.70 ***

Black

0.74

0.51 **

Asian

0.64

0.23 ***

Some other race

0.38 *

0.46 **

Education

1.03

1.10

Religion

0.96

0.95

Roman Catholic

0.99

1.32

Mormon

0.85

1.74

Orthodox

0.90

0.65

Other

0.87

0.78

0.99

1.00

1104

1104

Income
x2

179.30

df

16

n

The comparison group is respondents that have never heard of or can’t rate their feelings
toward Muslim Americans
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 8: Multinomial Regression Predicting Attitudes due to Contact and Identity- August
2009 Survey
Unfavorable

Favorable

Contact

1.60 ***

2.35 ***

Identity

0.64

2.34 ***

Gender

0.74

0.89

Age

0.99

0.99 *

Race

0.95

1.04

Black

0.72

0.95

Asian

1.99

1.0

Some other race

1.01

1.20

Education

0.95

1.12 *

Religion

0.97

0.93

Roman Catholic

0.67 *

1.11

Mormon

0.63

1.59

315690.8

257315.3

0.85

0.73

1.02

1.09 *

1291

1291

Orthodox
Other
Income
x2

167.90

df

16

n

The comparison group is respondents that have never heard of or can’t rate their feelings toward
Muslim Americans
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 9: Multinomial Regression Predicting Attitudes due to Contact and Identity with a
Comparison Group of Negative Attitudes
November 2001 Survey
Contact
x2
df
n

Favorable
1.55

**

1.45

***

179.3
16
1104

August 2009
Survey
Contact
x2
df
n

167.9
16
1291

The comparison group for both years is respondents that have negative feelings toward Muslim
Americans
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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